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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of 
Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment 
changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of 
labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and convex components of adjustment 
costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated 
to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic 
components of costs are also important. Finally, in most specifications both fixed and convex 
costs are higher for employment contractions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 In the last few years there has been a heightened awareness of the shortcomings of 
traditional models of factor demand based on convex and symmetric adjustment costs and of 
the need to consider more general adjustment cost functions (see Hamermesh and Pfann 
(1996) for a critical review). The increased availability of firm and plant level panel data made 
it easier to provide empirical evidence on these issues and has lead to a blossoming of 
empirical studies, particularly on investment.1 Recent contributions on labor demand are 
scarcer, although by no mean absent.2  
In this paper we intend to advance our understanding of the structure of employment 
adjustment costs, using a rich data set on Norwegian plants. In order to do that, we specify a 
simple optimizing model of labor demand that allows for a general structure of adjustment 
costs. In the basic specification, such costs are a function of net employment changes and 
include fixed, linear and quadratic components.3 The model is in the spirit of Abel and Eberly 
(1994) and can be thought of as a q model for employment. Like other models of this type, it 
generates a region in which labor demand does not respond to changes in fundamentals, 
because the gains from increasing or decreasing employment by one unit is not large enough 
to compensate the incurring of adjustment costs. By including a truly fixed component in 
adjustment costs, we allow for the possibility that the range of the value of fundamentals for 
                                                 
1 Among the most recent papers that analyze the importance of non convexities and irreversibility in generating 
non smooth investment patterns see Doms and Dunne (1998), Goolsbee and Gross (1997), Barnett and Sakellaris 
(1998), Abel and Eberly (1999), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003), 
Letterie and Pfann (2002) 
2 See, the seminal contributions by Hamermesh (1989, 1992, 1995), and the more recent ones by Bentolila and 
Saint-Paul (1994), Rota (1995), Abowd, Corbel and Kramarz (1999), Abowd and Kramarz (2003), Campbell and 
Fisher (2000a,b), Goux, Maurin and Pauchet (2001).  
3 In this paper, for simplicity sake, we specify adjustment costs as a function of net employment changes, 
consistently with many papers in the literature. For specifications based on both net and gross employment flows, 
see Hamermesh (1995). See also Kramarz and Michaud (2002) and Abowd and Kramarz (2003) for a model 
based on gross flows. This is an issue that deserves further investigation. 
 
 3
which there are no employment changes may be wider for smaller plants (firms). Moreover, 
the response to fundamentals may differ for net employment increases versus decreases, 
reflecting asymmetries in adjustment costs.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we start by describing in details 
the Norwegian institutions regulating the adjustment of the labor factor. In Section 3 we 
present some descriptive evidence on employment adjustment patterns for plants in the 
machinery and metal product sector over the period 1986-1995. Section 4 contains a 
theoretical model that is potentially consistent with the descriptive statistics and that will 
underpin our econometric estimation. In Section 5 we present econometric estimates of 
various versions of the model. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Determinants of Adjustment Costs 
 
 The costs of changing employment are of course affected by the institutional setting 
and legislation introduced to protect workers against unfair dismissal. Both the rules regarding 
individual and collective dismissals, and the flexibility of plants with respect to temporary 
hiring and the use of subcontractors, are important in explaining the costs of adjustment for 
plants. The different types of constraints regulating the hiring and firing of workers are not 
completely transparent, since, in addition to national laws, collective agreements between 
employer and workers organization also are very important in regulating the adjustment of the 
labor factor. These agreements may differ across industries and workers, depending upon age, 
tenure, etc.  
Two main laws govern the labor relations in Norway: the law on employment 
(“Sysselsettingsloven”) and the law on labor relations (“Arbeidsmiljøloven”). The law on 
employment mainly regulates changes in labor during a period of restructuring and mass lay-
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offs by the firm. The latter was enacted in 1982 and it includes standards for general working 
conditions, overtime regulations and legal regulation for employment protection. According to 
the law on labor relations, dismissals for individual reasons are limited to cases of disloyalty, 
persistent absenteeism etc., while dismissals for economic reasons are automatically unfair. In 
general it is possible but very difficult to replace an individual worker in a given job with 
another worker. Hence, in general, there is a strong degree of employment protection in 
Norway. The law on employment states that the general rule for laying off a worker for 
economic reasons is that it layoffs can occur only when the job is “redundant” and the worker 
cannot be retained in another capacity. This regulation covers all workers independent of how 
long ago he/she has been hired. Requirements for collective dismissals in Norway basically 
follow the common minimum rules for EU-countries. It is important to notice is that a firm can 
dismiss workers not only when it is making losses but also when it has poor performance. 
There is not actually any rule on the selection of workers to be dismissed. However, the legal 
practice narrows down which workers can be dismissed. Conversations with lawyers in the 
employees’ organizations indicate that a lot if not most of the cases of dismissals are taken to 
court, which is costly for the firms.  
When it comes to other costs of dismissal, according to the employment law, 
employment is terminable with one month’s notice in Norway for workers with tenure less or 
equal to five years. This one-month notice is at the lower end of the spectrum compared to 
many countries. However, most workers have a three months’ notice requirement for both 
parties of the contract. Although there is no generalized legal requirement of severance pay in 
Norway, agreements in the private sector require lump-sum payments to workers who have 
reached age 50-55. As an example, in the contract between LO (the largest blue collar workers 
organization) and NHO (the employers’ association), a worker who is 50 and has been 
working for 10 consecutive years or 20 years in the firms is eligible for one to two months 
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pay. Comparable agreements exist for the other unions. Some EU-countries actually have even 
stronger job protection rules, including also general compensation, a social plan for re-training 
or transfer to another plant within a firm for instance. Although not mandatory, some of these 
other requirements are also commonplace in Norway. For this set of dismissal restriction, 
Norway is ranked slightly below average among OECD countries. Note finally that while 
some costs of reducing the workforce (such as redundancy payments) are related to the size of 
the reduction, others (such as advance notice requirements, legal and other administrative 
costs, etc.) may have significant fixed components. 
The work force flexibility of an economy can be enhanced by allowing fixed-term 
contracts in addition to standard contract, and the use of temporary work agencies. In many 
OECD countries there has been a strong trend in liberalizing the use of these two schemes. In 
Norway, the use of fixed term contracts is allowed only for limited situations, such as specific 
projects, seasonal work or the replacement of workers who are absent temporary. However, it 
may not necessarily be as restrictive as it appears since defining a specific project for a firm is 
partly open to discretion. Repeated temporary contracts are possible with some limitations, 
and there is no rule limiting the cumulated duration of successive contract. In general the use 
of temporary work agencies are prohibited, but wide exceptions exists for service sector 
occupations. Restrictions for the number of renewals exist also here, and two years is the 
maximum for cumulated contracts. Compared to other OECD countries, Norway is ranked a 
little bit above average for the strictness of the use of temporary employment (OECD, 1999). 
Very few comparative studies of the overall degree of employment protection exist. A 
much-sited study by Emerson (1987), ranks Italy as having the strongest employment 
protection rules while the UK and partly Denmark are at the other end of the spectrum. 
Norway is ranked together with Sweden, France and partly Germany (when all regulations are 
taken together) as an intermediate country with a fairly high degree of protection. Obviously 
 6
inter-country comparisons are difficult. The most recent comparison was made by OECD in 
1999, where Norway is ranked as number 12 out of 19 OECD countries for the late 1980s, and 
as number 19 out of 26 OECD countries for the late 1990s in the degree of restrictiveness 
(OECD, 1999). Evidence on the flexibility of the Norwegian economy from job and worker 
flows data suggests that it is about average for OECD countries, although worker flows are a 
bit below average.4 The overall impression is that legislation, contracts, and common practice 
impose important additional costs in Norway when adjusting the labor force downward, and 
possibly upward as well.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
3.1. The Data 
 Our empirical work is based on yearly plant level information for the period 1986-1995 
contained in Manufacturing Statistics including production, sales, employment, production 
costs, the age of the plant, and whether the plant belongs to a multi-plant or single plant firm 
(see Halvorsen, Jenssen and Foyn (1991)). Total sales are calculated by adding sales of 
produced goods and traded goods, income from repairs and contracted works, income from 
deliveries and leasing to other plants in same firm. We are forced to restrict our attention to 
plants with at least five employees, since plant or firm specific information is not available for 
plants below five employees. We have excluded all auxiliary units which do not take part 
directly in production, such as separate storage and office units. Plants in which the central or 
local governments own more than 50 percent of the equity have been also excluded from the 
sample, as well as observations that are reported as “copied from previous year”. This actually 
means that a data entry is missing. The remaining data were trimmed to remove outliers. 
                                                 
4 See Salvanes (1997). 
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 In this paper we focus on plants in the metal products and machinery industries (ISIC 
38), excluding large-construction and shipbuilding industry. Concentrating on a single 
industry reduces the heterogeneity problem in estimation. Moreover, sector 38 is an important 
one, accounting for 35% of manufacturing employment in 1990, and it contains a large 
number of plants of different size. Finally, we included only series with at least six 
consecutive observations, since one of the estimation methods requires the availability of a 
reasonable minimum number of years of data for implementation. The final unbalanced panel 
contains production plants with a total of 8414 observations from 1047 plants. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 What are the basic patterns of employment changes for our sample of Norwegian 
plants? We summarize the basic characteristics of the distribution of net employment changes 
in Table 1. Employment increases and decreases occur with similar frequency: approximately 
40% of the observations represent positive employment changes while 42% correspond to 
employment decreases. Interestingly in almost 18% of cases we observe no employment 
changes. This may be suggestive of the fact that changing the number of jobs even by a very 
small amount may imply sizeable adjustment costs that deter plants from adjusting. This 
would be the case for instance, in the presence of fixed or linear components of adjustment 
costs. If the plant increases the work force, the more frequent changes occur in the interval (0, 
+20%]. This occurs 30% of the times (unconditionally) or 71% of the time, conditional on the 
plant expanding, and it represents a 52% share of total employment increases. Similarly, if the 
plant contracts, decreases in the interval [-20%, 0) occur 32% of the times (unconditionally) 
and 79% of the times, conditionally on the plant contracting, and it represents a 56% share of 
total employment decreases. Although changes in excess of plus or minus 20% are less 
frequent, the account (obviously) for close to half of employment increases or decreases. 
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The pattern of adjustment differs in at least one important way across plants of 
different sizes. The frequency of episodes characterized by no employment changes decreases 
markedly with size. The frequency of zero episodes is approximately 25% for plants of 25 
workers or less, 10% for plants of 25-50 workers, 5% for plants of 51-100 workers and 3% for 
plants larger than 100 workers. There are several reasons why there is a connection between 
plant size and the frequency of no employment change episodes. One possible explanation 
may be the existence of a pure fixed component of adjustment costs associated with net job 
contraction, net job expansion, or both. Such fixed component is a bigger relative burden for 
smaller plants and may induce more infrequent adjustments for such plants. For the very 
smallest of plants there may also be an element of indivisibility that generates consequences 
that are observationally equivalent to those of fixed costs. Indivisibility becomes, however, a 
less plausible explanation for plants of more than 25 workers, some of which continue to 
display significant occurrences of zero employment change episodes 
 
4. A Simple “q” Model for Employment 
 
 In this section we develop a model for employment demand that allows for a general 
structure of adjustment costs and that is, at least in principle, consistent with the main feature 
of the data described above. The model is similar in spirit to q models of investment in the 
presence of fixed adjustment costs and irreversibilities (see Abel and Eberly (1994, 1999)). It 
is also related to the model in Hamermesh (1992) that also contains fixed, linear, and quadratic 
components of adjustment costs. The linear and quadratic components are a function of net 
employment changes. In this model the growth rate of employment is related to the shadow 
value of the marginal worker, denoted by q. q is the present discounted value of the marginal 
product of labor (which depends upon the structure of adjustment costs), net of wage costs. 
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Our empirical strategy is to use simple approximations to q and to estimate various versions of 
the model.  
More precisely, we assume that plant i maximizes the present discounted value of cash 
flow, defined as: 
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where tiL  denotes employment, ),( itit LAF  the gross production function, iiA  is a technology 
shock, itw  the wage rate per worker, and ),( 1−∆ itit LLG  adjustment costs, assumed to be a 
function of net employment changes.5 Adjustment costs contain fixed, linear and quadratic 
components. Fixed costs, in turn, contain two elements: 0a , that is truly fixed, and 11 −tLa  that 
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+
itD  (
−
itD ) is a dummy that equals one when the plant expands (contracts) and it is zero 
otherwise. Similarly to Abel and Eberly (1994, 1999), when plants increase employment, the 
proportional increase in employment satisfies: 
                                                 
5 Although capital is not introduced explicitly in the problem for ease of notation, plants should be thought as 
using both capital and labor. However, if capital is either not costly to adjust, or if its adjustment costs are 
additively separable from those for labor (there are no interrelated adjustment costs), then one would still obtain 
the same FOC’s for labor. In our model we also abstract from the choice of hours worked. 
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For employment to expand, it must be true that the marginal profits generated by the 
expansion are positive. This requires itq  to satisfy:
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Similarly contractions in employment obey: 
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Contractions occur when: 
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In all cases, the shadow value of employment, itq , is: 
                                                 
6 The upper threshold value of itq  can be derived by finding the value of itq  at which an addition of ∆Lit 
workers generates non-negative profits, i.e. 
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Equation (3) is used to determine the optimal value of value of ∆Lit. The lower threshold for itq , when 
contracting the number of workers, is found in a similar fashion. 
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itq  represents therefore the present discounted value of the marginal product of capital, net of 
adjustment costs, minus the flow of wage costs associated to the marginal worker.  
 In order to make the model estimable, we need to approximate the shadow value of a 
worker. We will assume that the latter is a linear function of the sales to labor ratio and of the 
wage. In the absence of an effect of the past stock of workers on adjustment costs, the 
marginal revenue product of labor would indeed be proportional to the sales to labor ratio if 
the production function is Cobb Douglas in labor (and capital).7 Moreover we assume that 
plants use simple AR(2) processes to forecast the sales to labor ratio and the wage rate. The 
main shortcut contained in this approximation is that we are abstracting from the fact that in 
partial derivative of the adjustment cost function with respect to the stock of workers, denoted 
by LG , given net hiring (firing) is not zero in our model. In the context of models based only 
on quadratic adjustment costs, this has been a standard approximation in empirical work.8 
When adjustment costs contain also a fixed component proportional to the stock of labor, one 
also abstracts from the effect of an extra worker on the expected present discounted value of 
these fixed costs. This is equal to the expected discounted sum of +1a  and 
−
1a , each multiplied 
by an indicator dummy that equals one depending upon whether the plant expands or contracts 
employment, respectively, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
7 Imperfect competition can also be allowed for, provided the markup is constant. In that case, marginal 
profitability is proportional to the sales to labor ratio, with a constant of proportionality that equals the elasticity 
of output with respect to labor, multiplied by the inverse of one plus the mark-up of prices over marginal costs. 
8 See, for instance, Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999) in the context of investment 
models with quadratic adjustment costs that are a function of both investment and the capital stock. The idea is 
that the derivative with respect to the capital stock is a function of the investment rate squared, which is likely to 
be small if the investment rate is not too big. 
 12
 Given all these assumptions, we will write the shadow value of employment as: 
 
ititit Zq εγγ −+= '10           (6) 
 
where itZ  includes present and/or lagged values of the sales to labor ratio and of the average 
wage rate per worker. Note that we have added an error term tiε  to the definition of the 
shadow value of employment to capture all those idiosyncratic factors at the plant level that 
are not observable by the econometrician. We will assume that itε  is normally independently 
distributed with mean zero and variance 2εσ . The presence of itε  introduces, in the simplest of 
ways, an error term in the two employment change equations, (3) and (3'). 
 Parameters estimates for the model summarized by (3), (3’), (4), (4’) and (6) can be 
obtained in several ways.9 In this paper we will employ a Heckman type two-step estimator. 
Computational simplicity is one of the attractive features of this procedure. First we estimate 
the Ordered Probit model for the probability of expanding, maintaining unchanged, or 
contracting employment to obtain the determinants of the shadow value of employment. Then 
we estimate the first order conditions for employment expansions and contractions, (3) and 
(3’), with the appropriate selection correction, using the estimate of the shadow value of 
employment obtained from the Ordered Probit model. More specifically, the Ordered Probit 
model can be written as: 
                                                 
9 Note that we are using the information on which regime the plant is in (positive employment changes, negative 
employment changes, no changes). The model estimated in Hamermesh (1989) and (1992) is instead an 
unobservable regime model, basically because it is assumed that when plants want to keep employment constant, 
they succeed only on average (since there is a mean zero error term in the do nothing equation). 
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where ( ).Φ  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Moreover, +Ω t , −Ω t , 
0
tΩ denote the set of plants present in the sample at time t that, respectively, expand, contract 
or maintain unaltered the workforce. Note that a ~ above a parameter denotes the ratio 
between the original parameter and εσ  (for instance, εσ++ = cc~ , εσ−− = cc~ , and that the 
parameters of the cost function can be identified only up to the scale parameter εσ . 
Furthermore, we are not able to identify the 0γ  from +b  or −b . The Ordered Probit model 
allows us to recover estimates of −−−−++++−+ +− 1010001 ~~  ,~~  ,~~  ,~~  ,~~  ,~~  ,~ acacacacbb γγγ . The 
estimate for 1~γ  can be used to construct a proxy for itq  and, together with those of the other 
parameters, allow us to estimate the expected value of the error terms in the employment 
change equations, conditional on the probability of being in an employment increase or 
employment decrease regime.  
 In the second step, therefore, we estimate the following two equations: 
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for employment increases and: 
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for employment decreases. The terms +itη and −itη denote zero means error terms, while +itλ  and 
−
itλ  denote the appropriate inverse Mills ratios and are defined as: 
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where (.)φ  denotes the standard normal density function. Equations (8) and (8’) are estimated 
by OLS after replacing '~1γ , +itλ  and −itλ  with the values constructed using the estimates 
obtained using the in the ordered probit model. Since size, itL , does not enter in the equation 
for net employment changes, but it enters the thresholds, we have now a useful exclusion 
restriction that can help us identifying the employment changes equations when we estimate 
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them using this Heckman type of procedure.10 Under the assumption that the variables in itZ  
are uncorrelated with itε , the ordered probit yields consistent estimates of the parameters (or 
functions thereof) listed after equation (7) and of their standard errors. OLS estimation of (8) 
and (8') yields consistent estimates of the parameters (if the sitZ
'  are uncorrelated with the sit
'η ), 
but not of their standards errors, because of the well-known generated regressor problem. 
However, since there is only one generated regressor in each equation, the estimated value of 
( )−+ ititZ λγ '~1  and ( )−− ititZ λγ '~1  respectively, the t-statistics to test the hypothesis that their 
coefficient is zero is valid (see Pagan (1984)). More importantly, given estimates of −c~  and 
+c~  from the second stage regressions, we can recover point estimates of +−+ 010 ~  ,~  ,~ aaa  and 
−
1
~a . 
In order to sharpen our inference, we will calculate the bootstrap value of the confidence 
intervals for  −−++−+ 1010 ~  ,~  ,~  ,~  ,~  ,~ aaaacc .
11  
The model summarized by (3), (3’), (4), (4’) and (6) could also be estimated by 
Maximum Likelihood. The log likelihood function can be written as:  
 
                                                 
10 See also Letterie and Pfann (2002) for a maximum likelihood application to investment and Lewbel (2002) for 
a semiparametric estimator of the second stage equation that relies on this exclusion restriction, also with an 
application to investment. 
11 In estimating the Ordered Probit model we have forced −−−−++++ 1010
~~  ,~~  ,~~  ,~~ acacacac  to be positive during 
the iterations (using an exponential transformation) in order to ensure that the argument of the square-root 
described in eq. (7) is positive. Note however, that we impose no restriction on +c~ and −c~  in estimating 
equations (8) and (8'). This implies that +−+ 010
~  ,~  ,~ aaa  and −1~a could be negative. 
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However, we have not had much success with the ML procedure. We have encountered severe 
convergence problem and we were unable to estimate with any precision the fixed adjustment 
cost parameters. Even when convergence was apparently achieved, the point estimates implied 
unreasonable values of the estimated probabilities of each regime. 12     
 
5. Results 
 
 In this section we will report estimation result for the model summarized by (7), (8), 
(8’), (9) and (9’). We have estimated various versions of the model based on different 
assumptions about the information set used by plants in forecasting the present value of 
returns to one additional worker and with different specifications of the fixed components of 
adjustment costs. In one specification (see Table 2, Column 1) plants are assumed to have 
contemporaneous information about sales during period t, tS , and the real wage per worker, 
                                                 
12 For instance, the estimated probability of the inaction regime was very close to one, while the ones for the 
employment expansion and contraction regimes were very close to zero. One conjecture is that in the full 
likelihood model, the thresholds parameters are basically pinned down only by the zero observations (see 
equation (10)), while in the Ordered Probit model (see eq. (7)) the positive and negative employment changes 
observations contribute to their determination.  
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tw , and tZ  is defined as [ ]1211 ,),/(),/( −−−−= ttttttt wwLSLSZ , where we are omitting the i 
subscript for simplicity throughout this section. We have experimented with dividing St by Lt 
or by Lt-1, and we report the results using the latter specification.13 In another specification, 
(see Table 2, Column 2) we do not include any contemporaneous variable and tZ  is defined as 
[ ]213221 ,),/(),/( −−−−−−= ttttttt wwLSLSZ . Results for the general specification of adjustment 
costs contained in equation (2) are reported in Table 2. In both the ordered probit model and 
employment equations we include three digit sectoral dummies, year dummies, plant type 
dummies, a size dummy (> 50 employees), and a dummy for the year of creation of the plant.14 
 The Ordered Probit results in Column 1 suggest that our proxy for the shadow value of 
employment depends significantly both upon the sales to labor ratio and upon the wage rate. 
More specifically, the coefficient of 1/ −tt LS  is positive significant and much larger (in 
absolute value) than the negative coefficient of 21 / −− tt LS . The coefficient of the 
contemporaneous wage is positive but insignificant, while the lagged wage has negative 
coefficient that is larger in absolute value and significant. This means that, looking at the sum 
of the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged determinants of tq , the sales to labor 
ratio has a positive effect and the wage a negative effect on the shadow value of labor tq , as 
one would expect. As a result, a (permanent) higher sales to labor ratio is associated with an 
increase in the probability of observing an increase in employment, while a (permanently) 
                                                 
13 Strictly speaking, in the model of Section 4, production depends upon Lt, so that division by Lt may appear 
more appropriate. Division by Lt-1 is would be more appropriate if workers become productive with one period 
delay. In this case, the model would be very similar, but the precise definition of the shadow value of 
employment to which the quadratic components of adjustment costs is equated, when expanding or contracting, 
would be slightly different. More precisely: 
[ ]∑∞
=
++++
−
++
+ ∆⋅−−=
0
1
11 ),(),('
j
jtjtLjtjtjt
j
tt LLGwLAFEq βββ . In the data, employment is measured 
in the middle of the year. 
14 Note that the inclusion of the size dummy does not affect our conclusions regarding the parameters of the 
adjustment cost function. Its coefficient in the Ordered Probit Model is actually not significant and the results do 
not change if its coefficient is set to zero. 
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higher wage is associated with a decrease in such probability. The opposite holds true for the 
probability of employment decreases. The average (across plants and time) estimated 
probability of the employment expansion, employment contraction, and no change regimes 
equal 0.384, 0.408 and 0.208 respectively. These figures make sense, given the descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 1. 
Estimation of the employment change equation with the selection correction, suggests 
that our proxy for the shadow value of an additional worker is significantly related to both 
employment increases and decreases. The point estimate for +c~  is 5.238 and for −c~ is 5.244. 
In order to assess the significance of the quadratic components of adjustment costs we also 
report the bootstrap 95% confidence intervals for +c~  and −c~ . In both cases the estimates are 
well bounded away from zero.15 Note that in this specification there is no evidence of 
asymmetries in the shape of the convex elements of adjustment costs.  
The estimates of the fixed costs parameters imply that it is the pure fixed costs 
components, that are the more precisely determined, while those proportional to the existing 
stock of workers are less precisely determined. While the estimates of +0~a  and 
−
0
~a  are well 
bounded away from zero, those for +1~a  and 
−
1
~a  are not (the 2.5th percentile is actually a 
miniscule positive number in both cases). Similarly, the coefficients of ++ 0~~ ac  and 
−−
0
~~ ac  are 
significantly or nearly so in the probit model, while those for ++ 1~~ ac  and 
−−
1
~~ ac  are completely 
insignificant. In terms of point estimates, it appears that it is particularly costly to fire workers, 
since −0~a  is one sixth the size of 
+
0
~a .  
All this suggests that plant size matters in determining the threshold values of tq  
beyond which the plant decides to increase or decrease employment. The range over which 
                                                 
15 The bootstrap confidence intervals are based on 1000 replications for the Ordered Probit model and for the of 
the employment equations. 
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plants keep employment constant is wider for plants with smaller initial employment, because 
both the lower threshold decreases and the upper threshold increases. The effect of size is 
much larger on the lower threshold. These overall econometric results seem to be very much 
consistent with the descriptive evidence discussed in Section 3, and in particular, with the 
larger frequency of zero employment changes episodes for smaller plants.  
 The second column of Table 2 contains the results obtained when only lagged 
information is used in forming a proxy for the shadow value of employment. This reduces the 
potential endogeneity problems due to the correlation between contemporaneous sales and 
possibly wages and the error term. Most of the previous conclusions still hold. Sales continue 
to play the important role implied by the results of Column 1. However, now the coefficients 
of wages lagged once or twice are not significant, and while opposite in sign, they are very 
close in absolute value. The purely fixed components of adjustment costs, +0~a  and 
−
0
~a , appear 
again to be important, particularly the one associated with employment reductions, −0~a . One 
difference is that the point estimate of −c~  exceeds the one for +c~  (8.089 versus 5.270). This 
suggests that it is more costly to adjust employment at the margin in a downward direction. 
 In Column 3 we have attempted to control for the presence of plants’ fixed effects in 
the ordered probit and hiring and firing equations. More specifically, we have included in the 
model of Column 2 the average value of the sales to capital ratio and of the wage rate, both in 
the Ordered Probit model and in each employment growth equations. This is tantamount to 
assuming that the plant fixed effect can be modeled as a linear combination of these two 
variables. In order to minimize endogeneity problems, we have taken the average over the first 
three years of observation and used the remaining years for estimation.16 Again sales play an 
                                                 
16 We use the same sample for estimation in all the specifications of Table 2. For the first two columns that do not 
contain the average wage rate and sales to capital ratio, one could use the initial years for estimation. When this is 
done the results are very similar and are not reported here. 
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important role in the determination of the shadow value of an additional worker. The effect of 
the wage is not precisely estimated, although now the negative coefficient 1−tw exceeds in 
absolute value the positive coefficient of 2−tw . The purely fixed components of adjustment 
costs, and not those proportional to the stock of workers, are still the ones that have a 
significant effect, particularly −0~a  which remains also much larger than 
+
0
~a . Finally, also in 
this case the estimate of −c~  exceeds the one for +c~ , suggesting an asymmetry of the quadratic 
component. On the basis of the 95% bootstrap confidence interval (or of the standard error) of  
+− − 00 ~~ aa , we can reject the equality of the fixed components during employment contractions 
and expansions. However, the same statistics for  +− − cc ~ ~  do not allow us to reject the 
equality of the quadratic parameters in the two regimes.17 
 We have already commented on the fact that +1~a  and 
−
1
~a  are not precisely estimated. In 
Column 4 we report the results obtained when +1~a  and 
−
1
~a  are set equal to zero.18 The 
likelihood ratio test of this restriction equals 4.42, with a marginal significance level close to 
10%. As in Column 3 we include the average values of the wage rate and of the sales to capital 
ratio. The qualitative conclusions we have reached on the basis of the specification in Column 
3 remain mostly the same. The purely fixed component when reducing employment is 
significant and larger than the one for expanding employment. However, now it is smaller in 
magnitude compared to its value in Column 3. The estimates of the quadratic components 
remain very similar to those in Column 3 
                                                 
17 The same is true for the other specifications in Table 2. 
18 If +1
~a  and −1~a  are zero, the specification of the shadow value of employment we have used is a better 
approximation to its true value, because it only omits the derivative of the quadratic component of adjustment 
costs with respect to the stock of workers. 
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  Since the adjustment cost parameters are estimated relative to the variance of the error 
term, it is not possible to make unambiguous statements about the absolute size of adjustment 
costs. However, we can assess the quantitative importance of the different components of 
adjustment costs relative to one another. This is a very interesting issue that our model can 
help shedding light on, although the results vary somewhat across specifications. In Figure 1a 
we have plotted, for different plant sizes, the value of the employment expansion or 
contraction rate that makes the size of the quadratic and fixed components equal to each other, 
on the basis of the estimates of Column 3. For instance, for a plant of 100 employees the 
quadratic components in a contraction equals the sum of the fixed components (the purely 
fixed one plus the one proportional to past employment) when the employment decreases at a 
rate of approximately 30% per year. For employment contractions greater than 30% the 
quadratic component is greater than the fixed components. When expanding, the fixed and 
quadratic components are of equal size for an employment growth rate of approximately 40%. 
Both figures increase as the plant size decreases, reflecting the presence of a purely fixed 
component. These results suggest a dominant fixed component, relative to the quadratic 
component, for most rates of change (positive or negative) experienced by plants. However, 
these conclusions are misleading because it is driven by the point estimates of the fixed 
component proportional to size, which is very imprecisely determined.  
 In Figure 1b we still use the estimates from Column 3, but look for the values of 
1−∆ tt LL that equate the quadratic component to the purely fixed component. In this case the 
employment rates need to be around 10% for employment contractions and 5% for expansions. 
 Finally, in Figure 1c we report the results for the model of Column 4, in which +1~a  and 
−
1
~a  are set equal to zero. In this case fixed costs and quadratic adjustment costs are of equal 
size for plants with 20 workers at employment contraction rates of approximately 10% or at 
employment expansion rates of around 2.5%. For plants of 100 workers or more, the figures 
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are 5% for contractions and very small for expansions. The bottom line is that for a small plant 
the quadratic components are always important. The purely fixed component is also important 
when employment contracts. For large plants the quadratic components are the dominant ones. 
In both cases, contracting is more costly than expanding at the margin. 
 A final issue worth addressing is how well the model does in predicting the aggregate 
investment rate for the plants in metal products and machinery industry. In Figure 2a we plot 
the aggregate net job creation (destruction rate) calculated summing over the sample of plants 
we have used in estimating the model (denoted by NJCR and reported on the right hand axis). 
We also plot the average ex-ante probability of an employment expansion, of an employment 
contraction, and the probability of no employment change, calculated using the estimated 
parameters of our model (see left hand axis).19 We observe that the average expansion 
probability tracks quite well the proportional change of aggregate employment, capturing all 
the turning points. The average probability of employment decreases moves, instead, strongly 
counter-cyclically relative to aggregate employment changes. The average probability of no 
employment change fluctuates less, but displays a counter-cyclical pattern as well. As a result 
recessions appear to be periods in which the probability of employment expansions decrease 
on average, while the probability of employment contractions and of no employment change 
both increase, although the movements in the former are more pronounced.  
 In Figure 2b, we use our model to calculate the predicted proportional employment 
change based on the parameter estimates for our model. Calculation of the predicted 
employment change for each plant at each point in time is based on the estimates of 
employment equations in the second stage, but also takes into account that the expected value 
                                                 
19 We have calculated the probability of each regime for each individual plant at a given point in time, using the 
parameter estimates of the Ordered Probit model. We have then taken the unweighted average of these 
probabilities across plants, for each t. 
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of the error term is not zero. The predicted proportional employment change for each plant is 
then aggregated across plants for each t, using lagged plant employment relative to total 
lagged employment as weights. The resulting predicted net job creation rate is reported in 
Figure 2b together with the actual value. Again we observe that the two series move pretty 
much together. Aggregate employment expansion in 1991 is over-predicted by the model, but 
the subsequent fall and recovery after 1993 are quite well captured.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 The results we have presented suggest that the q model of employment with a general 
specification of adjustment costs seems to be a useful way to organize the analysis of 
employment changes at the plant level. The initial results imply that it is important to depart 
from the standard specification of convex and symmetric adjustment costs. Fixed costs are 
important factors that the plant must consider when changing employment. The evidence 
suggests the existence of a purely fixed component, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the 
area of inaction is greater for smaller plants, which is consistent with the greater frequency of 
inaction episodes observed for them. Moreover, it appears that fixed costs are significantly 
larger when plants reduce their workforce. The fixed components proportional to size are not, 
instead, precisely estimated. Quadratic components of costs are also important. The point 
estimates in most specifications suggest that marginal adjustment costs are higher during 
employment contractions compared to expansions, although the difference is not significant. 
The fact that fixed and quadratic components of adjustment costs appear to be important when 
plants reduce their workforce is consistent with our understanding of the job protection 
legislation and practices in Norway. 
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 There are a set of issues we have not addressed and that need to be explored in future 
work. In particular, it would be useful to analyze the interaction between labor and capital 
adjustment costs. It would also be interesting to analyze how adjustment costs differ across 
different categories of workers, according to their skill level, for instance. Finally the issue of 
whether adjustment costs are related to net or gross employment changes, or both, deserves 
further attention. Still, the evidence provided in this paper shows the importance and potential 
fruitfulness of departing from traditional models of labor demand based solely on symmetric 
convex adjustment costs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for net employment changes, 
Freq. 1 by plant size
Freq. 1 Freq. 2 Share 4-25 26-50 51-100 101-
< -0.5 0.004 0.009 0.042 0.25 0.49 0.66 0.59
-0.5, -0.4 0.008 0.021 0.123 0.74 0.74 0.76 1.64
-0.4, -0.3 0.019 0.048 0.087 2.21 1.79 1.23 1.29
-0.3, -0.2 0.054 0.135 0.185 6.08 4.62 5.20 3.52
-0.2, -0.1 0.133 0.332 0.319 13.69 13.87 11.15 12.79
-0.1, 0.0 0.183 0.455 0.244 10.96 24.11 31.57 32.63
= 0 0.175 25.22 9.93 5.39 2.35
0.0, 0.1 0.162 0.382 0.218 9.32 23.24 27.50 28.05
0.1, 0.2 0.138 0.326 0.306 15.30 13.19 10.11 11.27
0.2, 0.3 0.057 0.134 0.145 7.46 3.51 2.93 2.93
0.3, 0.4 0.026 0.062 0.092 3.18 2.16 1.98 1.29
0.4, 0.5 0.020 0.048 0.080 2.97 1.05 0.38 0.59
0.5, 1.0 0.018 0.042 0.124 2.42 1.05 0.76 0.94
>1.0 0.002 0.006 0.035 0.20 0.25 0.38 0.12
Total #obs = #obs = #obs = #obs = #obs = 
8414 4881 1622 1058 852
Notes: Freq. 1 denotes the frequency relative to the entire set of observations. Freq. 2  denotes the frequency of each cell of positive 
(negative) employment changes relative to the subset of positive (negative) employment changes. Share denotes the share of 
total positive (negative) employment changes accounted for by each cell.
1−
∆
t
t
L
L
1−
∆
t
t
L
L
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Table 2.  Estimation results
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
Coeff. t -value Coeff. t -value Coeff. t -value Coeff. t -value
Ordered probit results
St/Lt-1 0.236 18.75
St-1/Lt-2 -0.073 -5.92 0.137 11.33 0.149 11.66 0.150 11.68
St-2/Lt-3 -0.069 -5.78 -0.049 -3.53 -0.049 -3.52
wt 0.117 1.11
wt-1 -0.307 -2.84 -0.135 -1.25 -0.166 -1.38 -0.169 -1.42
wt-2 0.146 1.35 0.109 0.85 0.106 0.82
a0+ * c+ 3.088 1.72 1.223 1.43 2.237 1.48 0.228 1.32
a0- * c- 18.062 2.49 27.164 2.98 19.504 1.13 5.082 5.88
a1+ * c+ 1.453 0.88 0.579 0.82 2.832 1.00
a1- * c- 2.707 1.04 6.490 1.34 2.442 0.46
Log-Likelihood -4844.97 -5022.57 -5014.88 -5017.10
OLS with selection correction
1/c+ 0.191 12.03 0.190 5.20 0.180 4.90 0.200 5.55
1/c- 0.191 15.68 0.124 8.75 0.123 8.71 0.130 8.68
Parameter estimates (confidence intervals in square brackets)
a0+ 0.590 [0.104, 0.987] 0.232 [0.001, 0.876] 0.402 [0.001, 1.153] 0.046 [0.002, 0.196]
a0- 3.445 [1.111, 6.208] 3.358 [1.239, 4.945] 2.390 [0.801, 4.556] 0.662 [0.477, 0.885]
a1+ 0.277 [0.000, 0.368] 0.110 [0.000, 0.358] 0.438 [0.000, 0.747]
a1- 0.516 [0.000, 2.196] 0.802 [0.066, 1.806] 0.347 [0.000, 1.636]
c+ 5.238 [4.403, 6.460] 5.270 [3.042, 20.120] 5.570 [3.165, 26.555] 5.003 [3.098, 14.835]
c- 5.244 [3.920, 7.589] 8.089 [6.332, 10.774] 8.162 [6.425, 10.848] 7.677 [6.096, 10.309]
# of observations
Ordered probit 5273 5273 5273 5273
OLS+ 2238 2238 2238 2238
OLS- 2080 2080 2080 2080
Notes: The first three observations for each firm are used to construct the averages of the sales-to-labor ratio and of the wage rate for the models of Columns 3 and 4
3-digit sectoral dummies, year-dummies, size (>= 50 employees), plant-type dummies, and dummies for year of creation are included in all equations.
For the bootstrap 1000 drawings are used.
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Figure 1: Relative size of fixed and convex costs. 
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Notes: The lines represent combinations of size and employment growth rates (positive or negative) 
for which fixed costs and convex costs are equal. 
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Figure 2a: Probabilities of employment going up, going down, and remaining the same 
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Figure 2b: Actual and predicted net job creation rate (NJCR) 
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